January 12, 2023
On Sunday, 1 January 2023 at 01:58:18 UTC, Walter Bright wrote:
> I know I'm not convincing anyone, and that's OK. Seg faults are a marvel of modern CPU technology, but 99% of programmers regard them as uncool as a zit.

Maybe this applies to the programmers that you know personally, but my experience is very different from yours. I guess, I'm lucky to be surrounded by much more competent people.

> I'm trying to make a point. Far too many software developers
> develop a hubris that they can write software that cannot fail.

It's the other way around. Inexperienced beginners tend to believe that they can write software that cannot fail, but this kind of delusion does not last long if they keep developing software and learn a thing or two.
January 11, 2023
On 1/11/2023 6:51 PM, Don Allen wrote:
> There is no difference whatsoever. The airplane (including pilots and ATC) remains a "known, unfixed, single point of failure" when you fly. Yes, the 737 is a safer airplane now that the rudder actuator has been fixed. The 737 Max has that fix, I'm sure. And 346 people died in  Max crashes because of a badly designed software change, a failed angle-of-attack sensor, (MCAS used only one of the two angle-of-attack sensors, which was crazy), pilots who weren't told about the software change and how to disable it in case of trouble, etc.

Oh, but the pilots were told. The pilots were sent an EAD (Emergency Airworthiness Directive) which explained how to disable it and live.

The MCAS was not a single point of failure.

> You persist in missing my point.

We're just talking past each other at this point.

January 12, 2023
On Wednesday, 11 January 2023 at 23:39:50 UTC, Walter Bright wrote:

>
> Far too many software developers develop a hubris that they can write software that cannot fail.

You seem to be attacking that poor strawman again.) I've never met a sober programmer who would claim he can write software that cannot fail. Minimizing the probability of a failure is still a good thing regardless of how much redundancy there is to deal with failures.
January 12, 2023
On Thursday, 12 January 2023 at 04:20:27 UTC, Walter Bright wrote:
> On 1/11/2023 6:51 PM, Don Allen wrote:
>> There is no difference whatsoever. The airplane (including pilots and ATC) remains a "known, unfixed, single point of failure" when you fly. Yes, the 737 is a safer airplane now that the rudder actuator has been fixed. The 737 Max has that fix, I'm sure. And 346 people died in  Max crashes because of a badly designed software change, a failed angle-of-attack sensor, (MCAS used only one of the two angle-of-attack sensors, which was crazy), pilots who weren't told about the software change and how to disable it in case of trouble, etc.
>
> Oh, but the pilots were told. The pilots were sent an EAD (Emergency Airworthiness Directive) which explained how to disable it and live.

Lion Air Flight 610 crashed on October 29, 2018, killing 189. The Emergency Airworthiness Directive was issued on November 7, 2018.

>
> The MCAS was not a single point of failure.
>
>> You persist in missing my point.
>
> We're just talking past each other at this point.

That is the only thing on which we agree about this.


January 12, 2023
On Thursday, 12 January 2023 at 02:34:39 UTC, Walter Bright wrote:
> On 1/11/2023 6:27 PM, Don Allen wrote:
>> See https://issues.dlang.org/show_bug.cgi?id=23485, "ImportC: two tests with gtk", posted 2022-11-14, tagged ImportC as you requested.
>
> Thank you. Can I press you to just quote enough of the .h file to show the problem, rather than a giant tar file?

No. I've done what I can and will for the D project. The information you need is in that tar file.

As I've already said, I am no longer using D for my own work, based on what I've learned about the nature of this project and its leadership in this thread. I said all this in a previous post.

Good luck with the project going forward. I mean that sincerely. I think you need to make some substantive changes in how the project is lead and managed, to get roles in line with abilities, but I do believe there is a core of good work here. I won't be posting here again.

/Don Allen
January 12, 2023
On 1/12/2023 12:14 PM, Don Allen wrote:
> On Thursday, 12 January 2023 at 04:20:27 UTC, Walter Bright wrote:
>> Oh, but the pilots were told. The pilots were sent an EAD (Emergency Airworthiness Directive) which explained how to disable it and live.
> 
> Lion Air Flight 610 crashed on October 29, 2018, killing 189. The Emergency Airworthiness Directive was issued on November 7, 2018.

That's correct. Months later the Egypt Air crash happened, as the pilots did not follow the EAD procedure.

What nobody reports on is that the first MCAS incident resulted in the plane completing its flight and landing safely. The pilots simply followed their training and did what the EAD reiterated. Boeing had issued the EAD to emphasize what to do.

The instructions are simple:

1. restore normal trim with the electric trim switches (all three crews did this)

2. turn off the stab trim system

That's it.

Crew #1: restored normal trim a couple times, then turned it off. Landed safely.

Crew #2: restored normal trim 25 times. Never turned it off. Crashed.

Crew #3: restored normal trim twice (if I recall correctly). Turned off trim when the airplane was pointed at the ground. Crashed.
January 13, 2023

On Thursday, 12 January 2023 at 20:21:42 UTC, Don Allen wrote:

>

As I've already said, I am no longer using D for my own work, based on what I've learned about the nature of this project and its leadership in this thread. I said all this in a previous post.

Good luck with the project going forward. I mean that sincerely. I think you need to make some substantive changes in how the project is lead and managed, to get roles in line with abilities, but I do believe there is a core of good work here. I won't be posting here again.

/Don Allen

Consider copying your earlier posts about our shortcoming to an email and sending it for the feedback campaign Mike is running. That way your observations (which do sound useful to me) are less likely to go to waste. That is, if you did not already do so.

January 13, 2023
On Friday, 13 January 2023 at 08:15:57 UTC, Dukc wrote:
> Consider copying your earlier posts about our shortcoming to an email and sending it for the feedback campaign

On bug reports:

1) he gives the info
2) D people be like "do more free labor to reformat this in a way that's more convenient for me"
3) he refuses

On feedback campaign

1) he gives the info
2) D people be like "do more free labor to reformat this in a way that's more convenient for me"
3) ........... it is a mystery!!!!!!
January 13, 2023
On Friday, 13 January 2023 at 14:05:13 UTC, Adam D Ruppe wrote:
>
> On feedback campaign

I sell software for a living, and people with proper feedback do not hesitate to send emails to feedback privately. The more you interact in public forums, the more people are criticizing with relatively random feedback for clout. It is all there is to it really, forums are largely a diversion.

January 14, 2023

On Wednesday, 11 January 2023 at 13:38:42 UTC, Dukc wrote:

>

Your observation does not contradict the original idea. An unrecoverable assertion failure is a recoverable input error from perspective of the operating system or a separate watchdog process - recoverable by restarting the crashed program. The point is, Each program needs to distinguish what it can handle by itself, and where it must consider itself out of control and leave it up to others to restart (or ditch) it.

My point is you can rarely decide upfront how to handle input to a public API, because the decision depends on how the API will be used:

(1)

to!int(readln); // "bad input error", expected to be recoverable

(2)

string s = <computation that may contain a logic error>
to!int(s); // "logic error", expected to panic

If you decide on 'assert', then (1) will require a redundant 'enforce'. If you decide on 'enforce', then (2) will require a redundant 'assert'.